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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of income inequality on the subjective well-being of different 
social groups in urban China. We classify urban social groups according to their hukou status: 
rural migrants, “born” urban residents, and “acquired” urban residents who once changed 
their hukou identity from rural to urban. We focus on how the horizontal inequality—income 
disparity between migrants and urban residents—affects individual happiness. The main 
results are as follows. First, migrants suffer from unhappiness when the horizontal inequality 
increases, but urban residents show a much smaller aversion to the horizontal inequality. 
Second, migrants will not be happier if their relative incomes within their migrant group 
increase, while urban residents do become happier when their incomes increase within their 
group’s income distribution. Third, “acquired” urban residents have traits of both migrants 
and “born” urban residents. They have an aversion to the horizontal inequality like migrants, 
and they also favor higher relative income among urban residents. Fourth, “born” urban 
residents have lower happiness scores when they are old. People who are Communist Party 
members strongly dislike the horizontal inequality. Our findings suggest that migrants, 
“acquired” urban residents, elderly people and Party members from “born” urban residents are 
the potential proponents of social integration policies in urban China. 
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1. Introduction 
With a foundation in the vast rural-to-urban labor migration, the urban–rural divides have 
been revealed in Chinese cities as social segmentation and inequality between the urban 
residents who have local urban hukou status and rural migrants who live and work in urban 
areas without urban hukou status.
1 Although the rural migrants contribute significantly to the 
city construction and are also acknowledged as the key factor in the booming of 
manufacturing industries, the hukou registration policy discriminates against migrants as a 
“floating population” and denies them equal access to social welfare programs compared with 
the local urban residents. The two connected but also segmented groups are forming “a dual 
society” in Chinese cities: migrants earn higher incomes than their rural counterparts, but 
under the urban–rural segmentation policy, their incomes are much lower than the local 
residents’.
2 Such hukou-identity-induced between-group income inequality is termed 
“horizontal inequality”, which is generally defined as an income disparity between different 
social groups in the same geographical area and is considered a more influential element than 
overall inequality in generating social conflict (Stewart, 2001). Does the horizontal inequality 
affect the happiness of urban residents and their neighboring migrants simultaneously? Which 
group of urban residents suffers most from the horizontal inequality with migrants? These are 
two core questions we try to answer in this paper. To answer such questions is of crucial 
importance because they guide welfare analysis of who suffers from income inequality, these 
 
1 Regarding the fundamental role of the hukou system in the socioeconomic segmentations in China, see Liu (2005), Wang 
(2004), and Wu and Treiman (2007). 
2 According to our sample data, the ratio of yearly household income per capita between the urban residents and rural 
migrants varies from 1.29 to 3.34 in 27 sample cities. It may be argued whether the observed income gap truly reflects 
discriminational urban–rural policies or just the ability differences between urban residents and migrants. If migrants are self-
selected from the lower tail of the ability distribution, the observed income gap may overestimate the effects of urban–rural 
segmentation policies. However, Jiang et al. (2008) and Chen et al. (2008) found that migrants are positively selected along 
the line of education level in rural China. Therefore it is more plausible that the observed income gap may even 
underestimate the effects of discriminational policies. We neglect the selection problem and do not discuss this issue in this 
paper.   3
people being the potential proponents of institutional change for social integration in urban 
China. 
We identify three specific social groups in urban areas of China according to their hukou 
status. The first group is rural migrants without urban hukou status. The second group is the 
“born” urban residents who were granted urban hukou status at birth. The third group is 
“acquired” urban residents who had a chance to change their hukou status from rural to urban 
at a certain point in their life (nongzhuanfei). As Deng and Gustafsson (2006) pointed out, the 
“acquired” urban residents can be regarded as “permanent migrants” who have distinctive 
socioeconomic characteristics. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses happiness studies, 
especially the empirical evidence from China and studies on happiness and inequality. Section 
3 describes the data. In Section 4, we investigate how horizontal inequality affects people 
with different hukou identities and characteristics using regression analysis, and also discuss 
the policy implications of our findings. The final part concludes. 
2. Literature review 
Subjective well-being, or happiness, once a hot topic for psychologists and sociologists, is 
gaining more attention from economists. Frey and Stutzer (2002) provided an excellent 
survey of subjective happiness research. Thanks to data availability, the number of studies 
examining happiness determination functions in China is growing. Here, we only consider 
happiness determination in China. Luo (2006) explored the effects of unemployment on 
happiness and found that families with unemployed members do have lower happiness scores. 
Knight et al. (2007) mainly examined the role of absolute and relative income on the 
happiness determination of rural China residents, and the results are in accordance with 
intuition: higher household income per capita results in a higher happiness level; higher   4
                                                
relative income status within the village also results in higher happiness. They also found that 
the effects of absolute/relative income vary with family economic conditions. Knight and 
Gunatilaka (2007, 2008) studied the happiness determination of rural migrants and used 
Easterling’s adaptation theory to explain that the reason for migrants having the lowest 
happiness scores is because they have changed their income reference group to urban 
residents, so their higher aspirations make them unhappier. 
All these studies increase our understanding of what determines happiness in China, yet 
none of them has also considered the effects of hukou identity and urban–rural segmentation 
on the happiness of migrants and urban residents. Knight and Gunatilaka (2008) examined the 
happiness determination of migrants, but they did not control for the hukou identity to see its 
effect on happiness. In fact, rural–urban segmentation in China is a political and economic 
institutional arrangement. People are labeled as rural or urban hukou when they are born, and 
even when rural migrants work in the cities, their hukou identities do not change. The city 
governments accumulate physical capital and enhance the welfare of only urban residents 
through rural–urban segmentation and urban-biased economic policy, thus leading to a huge 
income gap between rural and urban areas (Chen and Lu, 2008). Such identity-induced 
income inequality was also called “horizontal inequality”
3 by Stewart (2001). When there 
only exists limited mobility at the group boundaries, horizontal inequality will cause social 
conflicts and will thwart economic development (Stewart, 2001). We match the urban 
residents’ data and rural migrants’ data from the same city, and measure the horizontal 
inequality as the income ratio between urban residents and migrants to see whether hukou-
induced horizontal inequality affects equally the happiness of urban residents and migrants; 
 
3 In his seminal paper, Stewart (2001) proposed the concept of “horizontal inequality” and defined it as “existence of severe 
inequalities between culturally defined groups, …, horizontal inequalities are multidimensional—with political, economic 
and social elements.”   5
                                                
thus, we are the first to examine the distributional effect of urban–rural segmentation on the 
welfare of urban residents and migrants simultaneously. 
The effect of inequality on happiness is also a relatively new area. Alesina et al. (2004) 
found that the state-level Gini coefficient in the USA and the country-level Gini in the EU are 
negatively correlated with individual happiness. However, the effect of the Gini coefficient is 
unequally distributed among the rich and poor: poor people in the EU suffer from a larger 
Gini, but this is not the case for the poor in the USA The explanation for different attitudes 
toward inequality between Europe and the USA is that they have different subjective 
perceptions on social mobility. However, the negative effect of the Gini on happiness is not 
supported in China. Astonishingly, Knight et al. (2007) found a significant positive effect of 
the Gini on happiness in rural China. They explain it as a demonstration effect: with rapid 
income growth, the increasing Gini will make rural residents have greater expectations of 
being more highly ranked in the income distribution in the future, so they are happier to see a 
larger Gini coefficient.
4  
In this paper, we also consider the effect of inequality on happiness and set up the 
following hypothesis: In a dual economy like China people living in a city may not be 
sensitive to the Gini coefficient at the city level. Rather, segmented social groups in a city are 
only concerned with the income status within their own group and with the income gap 
between different social groups.  
To examine this hypothesis, we decompose income inequality into two dimensions. The 
first dimension is the within-group inequality. Specifically, we focus on relative income 
within the same hukou identity group. The second dimension is the horizontal (between-
group) inequality. We pay attention to the income ratio between different hukou identity 
groups: the urban residents and the migrants. One advantage of such decomposition is that we 
 
4 Interestingly, using the same dataset but only urban household and migrant subsamples, we find the same significant 
positive Gini effect when the squared term is not included. This will be discussed thoroughly below.   6
                                                
can consider which kind of inequality people may dislike, thus gaining a better understanding 
of the channels through which inequality affects happiness. 
3. Data description 
The data used in our research are from the urban household survey and migrants survey 
from the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project Survey (CHIP2002) collected by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science. The urban survey was conducted in 62 cities, but only 
27 cities have the parallel migrant household survey. Thus we only use the 27 matched cities 
in our subsample. The data include a series of individual and household characteristics and 
information on income. More importantly, there are attitude questions on “happiness” for the 
heads of households or a main member of the household.
5 
The dependent variable is the subjective happiness score of the household respondent. The 
same question was asked of one of the adults in each sampled household: “Generally speaking, 
how happy do you feel?” The six possible answers were: very happy, happy, so-so, not happy, 
not happy at all, and don’t know. This is the key variable in our analysis. We drop the 
observations with the answer “don’t know” and evaluate the other five answers as 4, 3, 2, 1, 0 
respectively. We mainly use ordinary least squared (OLS) regression in our analysis. The 
reasons are twofold: first, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) found that in a happiness 
function, the significance and sign of coefficients are robust to either OLS or ordered 
probit/logit. OLS regression is more intuitive and interpretable for the readers. The second 
reason is that we control the interaction terms in our regression, and it is hard to interpret the 
marginal effects of the interacted variables when using ordered probit/logit. Knight et al. 
(2007) and Knight and Gunatilaka (2007, 2008) also used OLS to explore happiness 
determination in China. We also estimate an ordered probit as a robustness check of the OLS 
 
5 For details of the sampling framework and sampling method of the CHIP 2002 survey, see Gustafsson et al. (2008).   7
results, however we stick with OLS because the interaction term in the ordered probit 
regression is not intuitive. 
The independent variables are structured as follows. First, we classify individual’s hukou 
identity using a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if she/he has urban hukou status 
and zero if she/he has rural hukou status. Second, based on the assumption that urban 
residents and migrants have different reference groups, we introduce a measure of relative 
income for the relevant hukou identity group calculated as household income per capita 
divided by mean income of the same group in a city. Third, as the measure of horizontal 
inequality, we utilize the income gap of urban residents and migrants calculated as the ratio 
between the mean income of each hukou identity group. This variable is regarded as a 
monetary measure of the socioeconomic gap generated by the hukou status combined with 
other discriminatory urban–rural segmentation policies. We also add an interaction term 
between horizontal inequality and hukou identity to examine the effect of income inequality 
on each group. Fourth, following the previous studies that found a statistically significant 
effect of the expectation for future income on current happiness (Luo 2006, Knight and 
Gunatilaka 2008), we introduce a dummy variable that indicates respondent’s expectation for 
income change over the next five years: “big increase”, “small increase”, “unchanged”, or 
“decrease” (“unchanged” as the base group). Fifth, we employ the log of annual household 
income per capita in order to control the influence of the absolute level of household income, 
Other controlled variables include sex, age, age squared, years of schooling completed, 
health condition, marital status, political identity, employment status, household living square 
meters per capita and city-level Gini coefficient.  
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 provide variable definitions and statistical descriptions. Appendix 
Table 1 presents the descriptions of horizontal inequality and city-level Gini for the 27 cities. 
Figure 1 shows a significant positive correlation between horizontal inequality and city-level Gini. The R-square for a simple regression of horizontal inequality on city-level Gini is 21%. 
In order to see more closely the role of horizontal inequality on general inequality, we apply 
the entropy index (with parameters 0, 1, 2) to decompose inequality into between-group 
(identity-induced inequality) and within-group inequality. From Appendix Table 2, we can 
see that the hukou-identity-induced inequality can explain 12.83–17.84% of total inequality, 
and the Theil index decomposition shows the amount of between-group inequality is 17.31%. 
Therefore, the horizontal inequality is an important source of inequality. Appendix Table 3 
gives the characteristics descriptions of migrants and urban residents. The last column is the 
p-value for the ANOVA test of equal means. From the table, we can see that the migrants and 
urban residents are two distinct groups of people: urban residents have higher happiness 
scores, and they have higher education levels and household incomes than the migrants; 
however, migrants are overrepresented by the male gender and are also younger, healthier, 
and more optimistic about future income change. 
4. Regression results 
4.1. Hukou, horizontal inequality, relative income and happiness 
We first examine how horizontal inequality and relative income impact on the happiness of 
urban residents and migrants respectively. We establish the following happiness functions: 
ij ij j ij ij j ij ij ij ij Happiness Hukou HI RI Hukou HI Hukou RI X β ε =+ + +× +× + + . 
HIj is horizontal inequality, and RIij represents relative income in the peer group. 
Subscripts i and j denote the individual and city respectively. We also add interaction terms 
between Hukouij and HIj, and Hukouij and RIij to examine whether urban residents and 
migrants have different attitudes toward inequality. Regression results are in Table 1. 
  8
Table 1 about here   9
                                                
We report four regression results in Table 1. In column 1, we do not control for the 
interaction terms between horizontal inequality, relative income and hukou, whereas column 2 
includes the two interaction terms. Columns 3 and 4 are robustness checks of the results in 
columns 1 and 2 respectively. What we are concerned with the most is the hukou, relative 
income, horizontal inequality and the interaction terms between them. Let us first see the 
effect of hukou identity. When the two interaction terms are not controlled for, the hukou 
identity is negative but insignificant, but it becomes significantly negative when the two 
interaction terms are included. Although the statistical descriptions of the CHIP2002 survey 
data suggest that urban residents have higher happiness scores than migrants (Knight and 
Gunatilaka, 2007), we find that the effect of hukou on happiness should also consider 
horizontal inequality and relative income. For an urban resident whose income equals the city 
mean, the marginal effect of hukou on happiness equals –0.2694 + 0.0864 + 0.1140 × 
horizontal inequality. Therefore for a city with a horizontal inequality greater than 1.6052, the 
marginal effect of hukou is positive, and vice versa. Because the horizontal inequality in our 
data ranges from 1.29 to 3.34, it is safe to say urban residents have greater happiness than 
migrants in most of the cities in our sample. The horizontal inequality created by rural–urban 
segmentation policy significantly reduces the happiness of migrants. For the urban residents, 
this effect is still negative, but the marginal effect is much smaller (–0.1035 + 0.0864 = –
0.0171). It implies that the income inequality affects migrants more than urban residents. It is 
plausible that when the rural migrants enter the cities, they change their perception of the 
living quality of urban residents and change their income reference group from that of their 
remaining rural counterparts to that of urban residents. Therefore, they suffer from 
unhappiness when the income gap increases.
6 However, urban residents are concerned more 
 
6 Another alternative explanation also leads to the above findings. Suppose there are no discrimination policies but only 
ability differences: migrants are moving into different cities, the migrants with higher education (proxy for higher ability) are 
more attracted to the wealthier cities to earn higher income; thus, the narrow horizontal income in such cities can be   10
                                                                                                                                                        
about their own income status within the urban residents group but not too much about the 
income inequality with migrants. The changing reference group hypothesis is also supported 
by the coefficients on relative income: urban residents are happier if their relative income 
status improves, but migrants are not happy when they improve their status within the 
migrants group. 
Rather surprisingly, the city-level Gini coefficient shows a significant positive sign. 
Interestingly, Knight et al. (2007) also found a significant positive county-level Gini for 
happiness when they explored the happiness determination of rural Chinese residents. We 
have a similar explanation to Knight et al.: in an era of rapidly increasing incomes, people 
may optimistically expect their future opportunities to be at the higher end of the income 
distribution (demonstration effect). However, we give little attention to the Gini because it has 
two problems: first, the population ratio between migrants and urban residents in our sample 
is not the true one in the real world, so the calculated city-level Gini may over- or 
underestimate the real Gini. Second, in our cross-sectional data, we cannot include the city 
dummies, so the Gini coefficient may contain the city characteristics. 
All the other coefficients in our paper are consistent with the findings in previous studies 
(Luo, 2006; Knight et al., 2007; Knight and Gunatilaka, 2007, 2008). Compared with females, 
males have lower happiness scores, possibly because they shoulder more responsibility in 
society and face more stress. Age has a U-shaped nonlinear effect on happiness, with a 
turning point at age 38.1 or 38.8 in columns 1 and 2 respectively. Marital status influences 
happiness, in that compared with unmarried people, married people can enjoy a family life 
and thus they have higher happiness scores, but divorce significantly reduces happiness. 
Educational attainment has an insignificant effect on happiness; it is possible that people with 
 
explained by the higher-ability migrants. Higher ability positively correlates with happiness by intuition. In order to reject 
this explanation, we do the following procedure and find that: (1) migrants’ education levels do differ among cities, (2) their 
education can lead to higher income, (3) the higher the city mean income, the higher migrants’ education level, (4) however, 
in such cities, the horizontal inequality is larger, not smaller as the explanation predicts. Therefore, we reject this explanation.   11
higher education are more stressed in society and have greater aspirations. The same findings 
are in Luo (2006), where he used education level dummy variables, and all levels of education 
had an insignificant effect on happiness. Unemployment significantly reduces happiness. The 
log yearly household per capita income has a significant positive role on happiness even if the 
relative income is controlled for. The semielasticity of income is about 0.22 and is close to the 
estimation of Knight and Gunatilaka (2008). Political identity, measured as whether the 
individual is a Communist Party member, significantly increases happiness. Previous studies 
have confirmed that Party identity will bring higher income (Appleton et al., 2005; Li et al., 
2008); however, even when we control for the log household income, Party identity still leads 
to greater happiness because of nonmonetary benefits. The coefficients on self-reported health 
also accord with intuition: people who report themselves as in good health are happier than 
those reporting health as just so-so, and self-reported bad health significantly reduces 
happiness. People who expect they will have a big or small increase in income after five years 
are much happier, and big expectations lead to higher happiness scores than small 
expectations. Pessimistic expectations on future income lead to lower happiness. 
It is interesting to compare the magnitude of coefficients of horizontal inequality with 
other variables. Based on column 2 in Table 1, when the income ratio between urban residents 
and migrants is reduced by 1, its effect on happiness equals increasing household per capita 
income by 47.5%, or increasing living space by 25.2 square meters. 
4.2. How does “acquired” urban hukou affect income inequality, relative income and 
happiness? 
Although the hukou policy will survive for a long time, it is still possible to change rural 
hukou to urban hukou through attending college, becoming an official, joining the army, 
losing land to the government, buying a house in a city or even buying a hukou, etc. How   12
does a changed hukou status affect attitudes toward horizontal inequality? Will the once-rural 
hukou owners assimilate to the “born” urban hukou residents if the duration of their urban 
stay is long enough? These two questions need to be explored. If the once-rural hukou 
residents are averse to horizontal inequality, and at the same time, their attitudes are not 
assimilated, they will be potential voters for social integration policy in the future. According 
to the questionnaire, we further differentiate urban hukou into two new categories, with 
“born” urban hukou as 1 for those who have never changed their hukou status, and “acquired” 
urban hukou as 1 for people who used to be rural residents but acquired urban hukou status 
later in life. The basement group is still the rural migrants. The interaction terms between 
“born”, “acquired” urban hukou, horizontal inequality, and relative income (four interaction 
terms) are used to see whether these two groups of people have similar attitudes to inequality 
compared with migrants. We also interact the interaction terms of “acquired” urban hukou and 
horizontal inequality with years since getting hukou and years since getting hukou squared to 
check whether “acquired” urban hukou residents assimilate to the “born” urban residents. The 
regression results are in Table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
We discuss the three cases of hukou status. First, consider the results in Table 2, column 1. 
Like the results in Table 1, migrants show aversion to horizontal inequality (with a marginal 
effect of –0.1022), and they do not care about their income status within the migrants group. 
The “born” urban residents also feel unhappy about increasing horizontal inequality, but the 
marginal effect is quite small (only –0.0035 = –0.1022 + 0.0987). This implies that even with 
a tiny startup cost, the “born” urban residents may give up social integration policy. Again, 
they feel happier because of the improvement in their relative income status within the urban 
residents group. The most striking results here are those for the “acquired” urban hukou   13
                                                
residents: they have the same attitudes toward horizontal inequality as migrants—that is, they 
say they suffer from unhappiness when the income gap increases—but they also show greater 
happiness when their position in the relative income distribution improves.
7 To some extent, 
they have the traits of both migrants and “born” urban residents. Because the urban public 
policy in China is only determined by the urban residents (there are no “voting” rights for the 
people who do not secure a local urban hukou), the “acquired” urban hukou residents are 
actually the “spokespersons” for migrants. However, the sample statistics in our data show 
they are still in the minority among the urban residents (only 25.78%) and not influential 
enough to abolish rural–urban segmentation policy. 
In columns 2 and 3, we put the interaction terms between “years since getting hukou”, 
“years since getting hukou squared” and “acquired urban hukou × horizontal inequality” into 
regression functions. What we want to check is whether with a longer urban stay, “acquired” 
urban hukou residents assimilate to the “born” urban residents. If so, the two new variables 
will at least be significant. However, despite including a linear term in column 2 or adding a 
squared term in column 3, they are both insignificant. Therefore, it is safe to say that past 
rural life experiences have a persistent effect on perceptions of horizontal inequality. 
4.3. Who will be the potential proponents of social integration policy among “born” urban 
hukou residents? 
Our paper has already presented interesting findings. However, a more important and 
realistic issue is how to reduce the income gap between rural and urban China, which reached 
3.33 to 1 by the end of year 2007, the highest in the 30 years of reform since the opening up 
of China. What is worrying, with more and more migrants in Chinese cities, is that the 
traditional rural–urban divide has gradually become a divide between migrants and urban 
 
7 However, the coefficient on “acquired” urban hukou × relative income is only significant at the 10% confidence level, and 
its magnitude is smaller than the coefficient on “born” urban hukou × relative income. That is, the “acquired” urban hukou 
residents do not aspire to higher income as much as the “born” urban residents.   14
residents. Meng and Bai (2007) found that during 2000–2004, wage increases for migrants 
stagnated in Guangdong Province. Both Yan (2007) and Zhang and Meng (2007) found that 
the income gap between migrants and urban residents is still widening because of different 
returns to human capital. Although we have concluded that urban hukou residents 
(particularly the “born” urban residents) are less affected by the horizontal inequality, we still 
need to further elaborate the attitude of “born” urban residents toward horizontal inequality. 
This is because they are the most influential group on local policy. Specifically, we use a 
series of interaction terms between individual characteristics and horizontal inequality. Table 
3 reports the results. 
Table 3 about here 
In column 1 of Table 3, we add an interaction term between age and horizontal inequality. 
This term has a significant negative sign, and we know that people who are older than 47.9 
(0.3305/0.0069 = 47.9) turn from favoring horizontal inequality to disliking it. However, it is 
unclear whether this age effect truly captures the attitudes of elderly people toward horizontal 
inequality or whether something else does. The turning point is 48 years, and it is people who 
were born before 1954 (2002 – 48 = 1954) that are in the age group eligible to be sent to rural 
China in the intellectual youth movement. We are concerned that if this intellectual youth is 
not controlled for, the age effect only proxies life experiences in rural China. In column 2, we 
use a dummy variable for intellectual youth and its interaction with horizontal inequality. 
From the results, we can see that when intellectual youth experience is controlled for, the age 
effect remain almost the same, so it is safe to say that when growing older, people tend to 
dislike inequality. Another interesting finding is that intellectual youth experience brings 
more happiness if horizontal inequality equals zero, perhaps because bitter past life   15
experience in rural China creates lower aspirations. At the same time, intellectual youth 
dislike horizontal inequality compared with other “born” urban residents. 
In column 3, we interact Communist Party membership with horizontal inequality. We find 
that the Party members strongly dislike the horizontal inequality (with a coefficient of –
0.1476). It is not a surprising result because Party members are drawn from the elite of 
Chinese society, and they may have a strong taste for social justice and a much deeper 
understanding of the harm of horizontal inequality. 
In column 4, we add an interaction term between log household income per capita and 
horizontal inequality. Column 5 introduces an interaction term between years of schooling 
completed and horizontal inequality. The two interaction terms are both insignificant. 
Wealthier groups and well-educated groups seem to like the inequality. 
The above regression produces the following conclusions: with urbanization in an aging 
society, social integration between migrants and urban residents will be favored by “acquired” 
urban hukou residents, the elderly and Communist Party members. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we focused on how income inequality, specifically the horizontal inequality 
between urban residents and migrants, affects happiness. Our main empirical results are as 
follows. (1) Overall, the rural migrants will be unhappier when the income gap between them 
and urban residents increases, whereas urban residents show a much smaller dislike of the 
horizontal inequality. (2) Migrants will not be happier if their relative incomes within the 
migrants group increase, while urban residents will become happier when their relative 
incomes among their peers increase. Our explanation for this finding is that, along with the 
rise in relative income, migrants tend to change their income reference group from their 
migrant peers to the urban residents, while urban residents still compare income within their   16
own group. It is noteworthy that the hukou identity determines not only the individual’s 
income position in the urban society but also the pattern of formation of subjective well-being. 
(3) The “acquired” urban residents have a somewhat dual identity. On the one hand, they 
dislike horizontal inequality like migrants, but on the other hand, their income reference 
group is their urban resident peers, and they feel happier when they occupy a higher relative 
income position within the urban residents group. (4) For the “born” urban residents, they 
have lower happiness scores when they are aging. People who are Communist Party members 
strongly dislike horizontal inequality. 
Our empirical results contain strong policy implications. Accompanied by rapid 
urbanization and lagging social integration policy in China, cities in China do not eliminate 
the hukou institution; in fact, they divide urban residents and migrants. The major form of the 
“rural–urban divide” has been a transformation from a traditional “dual economy” between 
urban and rural sectors to a “dual society” between urban residents and migrants in urban 
areas. How to integrate the two groups is of crucial importance for sustainable economic and 
social development in China. The potential proponents of social integration policy will be 
those who are the most sensitive to income inequality induced by hukou identity: migrants 
who have no voice in local public policy yet; “acquired” urban residents who somewhat 
preserve rural characteristics; elderly people and Communist Party members among “born” 
urban residents. The characteristics of potential proponents imply that the urbanization 
through gradual easing of hukou policy and the aging of society are also beneficial for social 
integration in urban China.   17
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Figure 1   Relationship between horizontal inequality and city Gini coefficients
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Table 1 
Happiness functions of urban residents and migrants  
Dependent variable: columns 1 and 2 are cardinal happiness scores; columns 3 and 4 are 
ordinal happiness level. 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 




















Urban hukou identity × horizontal 
inequality 
  0.0864* 
(0.0485)    0.1289** 
(0.0640) 








Urban hukou identity × relative 
income 
  0.1140***
(0.0324)    0.1609*** 
(0.0449) 








Personal Characteristics      

































































































































(0.0697)   22
Constant  0.1159 
(0.3365) 
0.5485 




Number of observations  5674  5674  5674  5674 
F-test (or Log likelihood)  43.63  41.19  –6516.08  –6507.94 
R-squared (or Pseudo R-squared)  0.1437 0.1461 0.0615 0.0627 
Note: *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   23
Table 2 
Happiness functions of “born” and “acquired” urban residents and migrants 
Dependent variable: cardinal happiness scores; Regression method: OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) 






























































Years since getting urban hukou × 
“acquired” urban hukou identity × 
horizontal inequality  




Years since getting urban hukou 
squared × “acquired” urban hukou 
identity × horizontal inequality 
   0.0000 
(0.0001) 
Personal Characteristics     

































































(0.0013)   24




































Number of observations  5674  5671  5671 
F-test  36.4300 35.0800 33.7900 
R-squared  0.1467 0.1471 0.1471 
Note: *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   25
Table 3 
Happiness functions of only “born” urban residents 
Dependent variable: cardinal happiness scores; Regression method: OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 















(0.0027)    
Party member × horizontal 
inequality 
   –0.1476**
(0.0604)   
Log household income per 
capita × horizontal 
inequality 
    –0.0262 
(0.0552)   
Years of schooling 
completed × horizontal 
inequality 
     0.0041 
(0.0086)
Intellectual youth    0.2591*
(0.1341)    
Intellectual youth × 
horizontal inequality  
  –0.1244*
(0.0678)    





















































































































































































































Number  of  observations  2929 2929 2929 2929 2929 
F-test  29.42 27.07 29.12 29.02 29.06 
R-squared  0.1720 0.1729 0.1720 0.1705 0.1705 
Note: *, **, ***: Coefficient different from zero at 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels respectively. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   27
 
Appendix Table 1 
City-level variable definitions and descriptions 
Variable Definitions  Obs. Mean  s.  d.  Min  Max 
Horizontal 
inequality 
Income ratio between 
urban residents and 
migrants in a city 




residents and migrants  27 0.3461 0.0353 0.2794 0.4043
 
Appendix Table 2 










GE(0)   0.2528  0.2077  0.0451  17.84% 
GE(1)-
Theil Index 
0.2360 0.1952  0.0407  17.31% 
GE(2) 0.2939  0.2562 0.0377  12.83% 
   28
Appendix Table 3 
Personal characteristics variable definitions and descriptions 
Full sample  Urban residents  Migrants 
5674 3729 1945 
ANOVA test Variable Definitions 
Mean  s. d.  Mean  s. d.  Mean  s. d.  p value 
Happiness  Cardinal 
happiness scores  2.4455 0.8441 2.4857 0.8594 2.3686 0.8085 0.0000 
Male  Dummy variable, 
male = 1  0.4813 0.4997 0.4138 0.4926 0.6108 0.4877 0.0000 
Age    43.04 11.73 47.14 10.88 35.16  8.98  0.0000 
Marital status:  Married  Dummy variable, 
married = 1  0.9233 0.2661 0.9343 0.2478 0.9023 0.2970 0.0000 
 Divorced  Dummy variable, 
divorced = 1  0.0143 0.1186 0.0164 0.1269 0.0103 0.1009 0.0671 
 Widowed  Dummy variable, 
widowed = 1  0.0196 0.1385 0.0268 0.1616 0.0057 0.0750 0.0000 
Years of education    10.02  3.33  11.08 3.08 8.00 2.80 0.0000 
Unemployed  Dummy variable, 
unemployed = 1  0.0314 0.1743 0.0429 0.2027 0.0093 0.0958 0.0000 










member = 1 
0.2342 0.4236 0.3374 0.4729 0.0365 0.1876 0.0000 
House square meters per 
capita    14.15 9.59  17.26 8.34 8.21 9.02 0.0000 
Expect big income 
increase 
Dummy variable, 
expect big income 
increase = 1 
0.0368 0.1884 0.0196 0.1386 0.0699 0.2551 0.0000 




income increase = 
1 
0.4778 0.4996 0.4397 0.4964 0.5506 0.4976 0.0000 
Expect income decrease 
Dummy variable, 
expect income 
decrease = 1 
0.1646 0.3709 0.2006 0.4005 0.0956 0.2942 0.0000 
Health: Good  Dummy variable, 
good Health = 1  0.6972 0.4595 0.5884 0.4922 0.9059 0.2920 0.0000 
 Bad  Dummy variable, 
good Bad = 1  0.0515 0.2210 0.0678 0.2515 0.0201 0.1402 0.0000 
 